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Abstract—Android is becoming ubiquitous and currently has 
the largest share of the mobile OS market with billions of 
application downloads from the official app market. It has also 
become the platform most targeted by mobile malware that are 
becoming more sophisticated to evade state-of-the-art detection 
approaches. Many Android malware families employ obfuscation 
techniques in order to avoid detection and this may defeat static 
analysis based approaches. Dynamic analysis on the other hand 
may be used to overcome this limitation. Hence in this paper we 
propose DynaLog, a dynamic analysis based framework for 
characterizing Android applications. The framework provides 
the capability to analyse the behaviour of applications based on 
an extensive number of dynamic features. It provides an 
automated platform for mass analysis and characterization of 
apps that is useful for quickly identifying and isolating malicious 
applications. The DynaLog framework leverages existing open 
source tools to extract and log high level behaviours, API calls, 
and critical events that can be used to explore the characteristics 
of an application, thus providing an extensible dynamic analysis 
platform for detecting Android malware.  DynaLog is evaluated 
using real malware samples and clean applications 
demonstrating its capabilities for effective analysis and detection 
of malicious applications.  
Keywords— Android; malware detection; dynamic analysis; 
mobile security; malware analysis framework. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Google’s Android operating system (OS) is increasingly 
widespread within the context of the modern market. This is 
due to the advent and rapid expansion of smartphones, with the 
number of smartphones shipped in the 2000s and early 2010s 
having tripled from 40 million to 120 million [1]. Android has 
an estimated market share of 70-80%, and it is the most 
popular operating system for smartphones and tablets. Since its 
release in 2008, over 50 billion total app downloads have been 
recorded [2]. In fact, it is expected that a shipment of one 
billion Android devices will be delivered in 2017 [3]. 
However, the popularity and growth of the Android OS has 
exposed it to the increasing threat of malware. In preparation 
for this significant shipment of Android devices, cyber 
criminals have expanded their activities. This has resulted in 
active research and development concerning Android malware 
in an effort to protect users.  
The increased growth of the Android platform has 
highlighted the growing need for effective solutions to address 
the spread of mobile malware. The problem has worsened, due 
to the rapid evolution of mobile malware and its ability to 
avoid existing detection methods [4]. Furthermore, since the 
summer of 2010, there has been a 400% increase in Android-
based malware. Moreover, the total number of Android 
malware samples exceeded 5 million in 2014 [5]. Therefore, 
there is a need to find new solutions to this growing problem, 
since traditional signature-based antivirus solutions are not 
effective especially against zero-day malware.  
In recent years, several approaches have been investigated 
to improve the detection of Android malware. Many of the 
approaches have been based on static analysis while others 
employ dynamic analysis. Static analysis tools/frameworks 
such as Androguard [6], RiskRanker [7], APKinspector [8], 
Comdroid [9], etc. have been proposed, but these are 
vulnerable to the limitations of static analysis, i.e. detection 
avoidance by sophisticated obfuscation techniques, run-time 
loading of malicious payload etc. Several dynamic analysis 
based tools and platforms have also been proposed such as 
Taintdroid [10], Andromaly [11], Droidbox [12], DroidScope 
[13] etc. Some of these tools have been developed for a limited 
analysis scope. For example, Taintdroid, designed to detect 
only data leakage from an application. Other platforms, 
Droidbox for example, allow for dynamic analysis but only by 
manual means and hence cannot provide automated mass 
screening of apps without modification. Other dynamic 
analysis tools are either closed source or can only be accessed 
by submitting apps online for analysis, which can also limit 
automated mass analysis of apps by researchers/analysts. 
Hence in order to overcome the aforementioned limitations 
we are motivated to design and develop a platform for 
automated dynamic analysis of Android applications named 
DynaLog.  DynaLog is motivated by the need for the capability 
to automatically analyse massive amounts of apps and extract 
extensive characterization features that can enable us to gain 
insight into the dynamic behaviours of the apps. Furthermore, 
we want to be able to utilize these features to identify and 
isolate those applications that might exhibit malicious 
behaviour. In summary, the main contributions of this paper 
are as follows: 
 We present DynaLog, a dynamic analysis framework to 
enable automated analysis of Android applications. DynaLog 
is built upon existing open source tools thus providing an 
extensible framework that enables a wide-ranging scope for 
dynamic analysis of Android apps. 
 The framework components and features are described in 
detail. Furthermore, we discuss how existing open source 
tools such as Droidbox have been leveraged to build 
DynaLog and enable new app characterizing features that 
do not exist in most currently available dynamic analysis 
platforms.   
 We present extensive experimental evaluation of DynaLog 
using real malware samples and clean applications in order to 
validate the framework and measure its capability to enable 
identification of malicious behaviour through the extracted 
behavioural features. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II discusses the DynaLog framework. Section III presents 
evaluation experiments and discussions of the results. Section 
IV discusses related work while section V is the conclusion of 
the paper.  
II. DYNALOG FRAMEWORK  
As mentioned earlier, DynaLog is motivated by the need for 
automated analysis of massive amounts of apps using dynamic 
analysis to help identify apps with malicious behaviour. Hence, 
DynaLog is designed automatically to accept a large number of 
apps, launch them serially in an emulator, log several dynamic 
behaviours and extract these for further processing.  DynaLog 
has several components as shown in Figure 1. These include: a) 
Emulator-based analysis sandbox b) APK instrumentation 
module c) Behavior/features logging and extraction d) 
Application trigger/exerciser e) Log parsing and processing 
scripts.   
A. Emulator-based analysis sandbox 
Most dynamic analyses require a sandboxed environment to 
run and analyse the applications under test.  The DynaLog 
framework utilizes DroidBox [12] an open source tool that can 
be used to extract some high level behaviours and 
characteristics by running the app on an Android device 
emulator or Android Virtual Device (AVD). DroidBox extracts 
these behaviours from the logs dumped by logcat while the 
application is running on the AVD. It uses Androguard to 
extract static meta-data relating to the app and also utilizes 
Taintdroid for data leakage detection. Because DroidBox was 
the first open source dynamic analysis sandbox, it has been 
used as a building block for several dynamic analysis 
frameworks such as Sandroid [14], MobileSandbox [15] and 
Andrubis [16]. Table 1 shows the high level behaviours 
(features) that are available with DroidBox.  
DynaLog was developed within the Santoku Linux 
environment because this Linux distribution is aimed at 
providing tools and utilities for Android security analysis. 
Santoku has the tools that DroidBox depends on to function 
properly including the Android platform tools such as adb, 
logcat, Android emulator images etc. Since DynaLog 
framework obtains the DroidBox-based default features shown 
in Table 1, from an emulator, it was necessary to enhance the 
emulator image as much as possible by changing some of its 
properties to bring it closer to a real device as possible (from 
the viewpoint of an application under analysis). This is because 
some malware are known to hide their malicious behaviour if 
through fingerprinting, they discover that they are installed and 
running in an emulator. The following have been applied to 
enhance the DynaLog framework sandbox emulator: 
 
TABLE I.  DEFAULT DROIDBOX FEATURES INCORPORATED INTO 
DYNALOG 
 
 Because some applications can hide their malicious 
behaviour when running in an emulator, modifications 
were made to the IMEI, IMSI, Sim_Serial number, 
and phone number. For example, the default emulator 
IMEI number ‘000000000000000’, was changed to a 
real IMEI number, ‘122XXX62XXX5532’ using a 
hex editor to modify the property within the emulator 
image. 
 Contact information was added to the emulator’s 
Android.contact using the push command, ‘$ adb 
push contacts.vcf /sdcard/contacts.vcf’. 
Even though DroidBox provides some features for 
characterizing applications, it does not provide the ability to 
log API calls. Android has hundreds of (Android and Java 
based) API calls that can be traced when the app is running on 
the emulator.  Many of these API calls can be very helpful in 
identifying malicious behaviour and also in providing better 
characterization of applications in general.  Also, the DroidBox 
features do not provide information that is granular enough or 
provides enough context for the behaviour. For example the 
Recvaction feature does not break down the broadcast events 
received. Also the Dexclass feature does not provide enough 
context of the loaded class. These limitations would make it 
more difficult to identify malware or malicious behaviour 
effectively.  
 Within the DynaLog framework new (granular) features 
have been enabled by extracting lower level features from the 
higher level Recvaction feature available in DroidBox. These 
features are represented by dozens of events/actions called by 
Intents within the application being analysed. In DynaLog we 
provide the capability to log and extract these events which can 
be used as features to characterize apps and potentially 
distinguish malware from benign applications.  
B. APK instrumentation module 
As mentioned earlier, the open source DroidBox tool does not 
have the capability to extract and log API calls which are 
useful characteristics for dynamic analysis. Hence, we added 
an instrumentation module to DynaLog in order to enable API 
calls to be monitored, logged and extracted. The 
instrumentation module leverages APIMonitor, an open source 
tool that allows Android APKs to be instrumented using (smali 
Feature Abbreviation Feature Description 
Hashes Hashes for the analysed package 
Opennet + Recvnet + 
Sendnet 
Connections made with particular networks 
Accessedfiles + Fdaccess Reading and writing files 
Servicestart Started services 
Dexclass Loaded classes through DexClassLoader 
Dataleaks 
Information leaks via the network, file, and 
SMS 
Enfperm Circumvented permissions 
Cryptousage 
Cryptographic operations performed using 
the Android API 
Recvaction Listing broadcast receivers 
Sendsms + Phonecalls Sent SMS and phone calls 
and baksmali) assembler/disassembler tools. APIMonitor was 
developed by Yang at GSoC 2012 [12]. Leveraging 
APIMonitor allows DynaLog to be able to instrument an APK 
to monitor any API call available within Android and/or Java 
that developers can use to develop the apps. But since our main 
goal is to detect malicious behaviour we will be mostly 
interested in API calls that are commonly used by malware. 
 The instrumentation process involves reverse engineering 
the dex file using baksmali and inserting signatures that can be 
used to monitor the presence of an API call’s class or methods 
within the log of the emulator while the app is running. As 
shown in Figure 1, the API calls instrumentation signatures 
are provided as a ‘list’ to the APIMonitor tool, and DynaLog 
automates the process of inserting the signatures to each 
application to be analysed in the first step within the overall 
analysis process shown in Figure 1. Examples of API call logs 
that DynaLog can extract after instrumenting an app are 
shown in Figure 2 below.  The first one shows an API call that 
that sends via SMS the message ‘532711’ to the destination 
number ‘1782’. The second example shows another API call 
to execute a process.  
 
Fig. 2. API calls from an instrumented application 
C. Behaviour logging and extraction 
DynaLog implements capability to extract specific log entries 
that correspond to monitored behaviours or API call 
signatures. If the extracted log entry is a high level property 
that could be further dissected into lower level features, the 
extracted entry is further parsed to capture the lower level 
features. Indeed, this is the case with the Recvaction log entry 
provided by DroidBox.   
D. Application trigger/exerciser 
Android applications typically have a main application 
launcher activity which is usually the first screen that users 
interact with or see when an application is launched. As the 
user interacts with the screens, several paths are traversed to 
invoke its functionalities. With automated dynamic analysis, 
code coverage is an issue because the apps have to be 
artificially stimulated and it is often not possible to invoke all 
the application’s paths during analysis. DroidBox includes 
MonkeyRunner by default. MonkeyRunner is an application 
exerciser that comes as one of the Android platform tools with 
the Android SDK and is provided for automated testing of 
applications.  It sends random events such as ‘touch screens’, 
‘swipes’, ‘presses’ etc. to an application under test. DroidBox 
only invokes the main application launcher activity by default. 
Thus, in order to improve code coverage for the DynaLog 
framework, we included capability to invoke all the activities 
and services that are present within an application. Presently 
DynaLog also uses MonkeyRunner to exercise the applications 
(with up to 3000 random events). In future we plan to 
incorporate a more advanced exerciser to ensure greater 
application path traversal.  
E. Log parsing and processing  
In DynaLog, extracted features are properly formatted into 
readable output reports for each application being analysed 
with the automated framework. This allows the features present 
in each application to be overviewed at a glance or processed 
further by a classification engine. 
III. DYNALOG FRAMEWORK EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate our proposed framework, we performed 
several experiments to investigate its capabilities using both 
benign applications and malware samples. We used 1226 real 
malware samples from 49 families of the Malgenome Project 
malware dataset. The families and their corresponding numbers 
are shown in Table II. Furthermore, a set of 1000 internally 
vetted benign APKs from McAfee Labs were utilized. 
Therefore, a total of 2226 malware and benign applications 
were used to conduct the experiments. Out of these, we were 
able to analyse 970 malware samples and 970 benign samples 
due to some of the applications not executing properly.  
 
Fig. 1. DynaLog architecture 
LAndroid / telephony /SmsManager;−> sendTextMessage ( Ljava / lang / String ;= 
1782 | Ljava / lang /String;= null| Ljava / lang / String;= 532711 | LAndroid /app/ 
Pending Intent ;= null | LAndroid /app/ Pending Intent ;= null )V 
Ljava / lang /Runtime;−>exec ( [ Ljava / lang / String ;={ / data / data / org . zen 
though t . flashrec / cache / asroot , / data / data / org.zenthought.flashrec / cache / 
explXXXXXX, / data / data / org.zenthought.flashrec / cache / dump image , recovery 
, /mnt/ sdcard / recovery −backup . img }) Ljava / lang / Process ;= Process [ id=541] 
A. Experiment 1: Evaluating high level behaviour features 
As discussed in the previous section, DynaLog initially had 
high level behaviour features shown in Table I, which are 
obtained from the DroidBox component. In a preliminary 
experiment we tested these high level features using 106 
APKs—53 benign and 53 malicious—for three minutes each 
by configuring DynaLog to enable only these default DroidBox 
based features. The results are shown in Figure 3, and they 
illustrate a lack of detailed information that can be used to 
distinguish between malware and benign applications 
effectively. Thus from this figure, it is clear that the high level 
behaviours captured by the DroidBox properties are neither 
extensive nor granular enough to provide good classification of 
applications.  
B. Experiment 2: Evaluating extended features and sandbox 
enhancements within DynaLog 
As mentioned before, DynaLog enables new granular features 
by extracting further properties from the high level behaviour 
properties that DroidBox provides. In particular, Recvaction is 
used to extract several ‘events’ and ‘actions’ shown in Table 
III.  Figure 4 shows sample output from Recvaction. From this, 
DynaLog can extract the BOOT_COMPLETED and 
UMS_DISCONNECTED events for the application. These are 
new features defined in DynaLog which other dynamic 
analysis framework do not have. 
 
Fig 3. Behaviour logs from 106 APKs using DynaLog configured to enable 
only the default DroidBox features. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Sample of the output from ‘recvsaction’ 
The other set of extended features available from DynaLog 
are the API call traces. These are from the instrumentation 
module described in the previous section. An extensive API 
signature list has been included to track API calls that are 
likely to be found in malware applications. This signature list 
includes those for Telephony Manager API through which the 
following DynaLog features can be tracked: ‘device_ID’, 
‘subscriber_ID’, ‘lineNumber’, ‘SimSerialNumber’, and 
‘SimOperatorNumber’.  These features are crucial for detecting 
malicious applications. 
 Figure 5 illustrates the impact of granular properties (i.e. 
events) when both benign and malware samples were tested on 
the extended features of DynaLog. It can be seen that some of 
the features allow for better separation of malware from benign 
applications. ‘PHONE_STATE’ and ‘BOOT_COMPLETED’ 
were observed more frequently with the malware samples. 
60% of the malware samples listened for the 
BOOT_COMPLETED event, whereas only 15% of the benign 
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TABLE II.  MALWARE FAMILIES USED AND THEIR NUMBERS 
Family 
No. of 
samples 
Family 
No. of 
samples 
DroidKungFu3 309 GPSSMSSpy 6 
AnserverBot 187 HippoSMS 4 
BaseBridge 122 GingerMaster 4 
DroidKungFu4 96 DroidKungFuSapp 3 
Geinimi 69 TapSnake 2 
Pjapps 58 Crusewin 2 
KMin 52 Nickyspy 2 
GoldDream 47 RogueLemon 2 
DroidDreamLight 46 SMSReplicator 1 
DroidKungFu1 34 Walkinwat 1 
DroidKungFu2 30 Endofday 1 
ADRD 22 GGTracker 1 
YZHC 22 GamblerSMS 1 
DroidDream 16 Lovetrap 1 
jSMSHider 16 Zitmo 1 
Zsone 12 CoinPirate 1 
zHash 11 DogWars 1 
Plankton 11 NickyBot 1 
SndApps 10 DroidCoupon 1 
BgServ 9 DroidDeluxe 1 
RogueSPPush 9 Spitmo 1 
Gone60 9 DroidKungFuUpdate 1 
Asroot 8 FakeNetflix 1 
BeanBot 8 Jifake 1 
FakePlayer 6   
TABLE III.  ANDROID EVENTS AND ACTIONS RELATED TO MALWARE [4] 
Event Abbreviation Event Abbreviation Event Abbreviation 
BOOT_COMPLETED 
BOOT (Boot 
Completed) 
SMS_RECEIVED 
WAP_PUSH_RECEIVED 
SMS (SMS/MMS) ACTION_MAIN 
MAIN (Main 
Activity) 
PHONE_STATE 
NEW_OUTGOING_CALL 
CALL 
(Phone Events) 
UMS_CONNECTED 
UMS_DISCONNECTED 
USB (USB Storage) 
CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE 
PICK_WIFI_WORK 
NET (Network) 
PACKAGE_ADDED 
PACKAGE_REMOVED 
PACKAGE_CHANGED 
PACKAGE_REPLACED 
PACKAGE_RESTARTED 
PACKAGE_INSTALL 
PKG (Package) 
ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED 
ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED 
BATTERY_LOW 
BATTERY_OKAY 
BATTERY_CHANGED_ACTION 
BATT 
(Power/Battery) 
USER_PRESENT 
INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED 
SIG_STR 
SIM_FULL 
SYS (System 
Events) 
"recvsaction": { 
"com.google.ssearch.Receiver": "Android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" 
"com.Android.view.custom.BaseABroadcastReceiver":    
"Android.intent.action.UMS_DISCONNECTED" 
}, 
samples that were tested did. Even though ‘PHONE_STATE’ 
was used by almost half of the benign samples, over 90% of 
the malware samples logged this event. 
 In order to investigate the impact of the sandbox 
enhancements implemented to make the emulator seem more 
realistic to applications, we employed 31 samples from the 
DroidKungFu1 family.  The results are shown in Table IV.  
We observed that for some features such as DeviceId, 
SubscriberId, RuntimeExec, SimSerialNumber, 
getLineNumber there was a marked difference in the results 
observed before enhancement and after enhancement.  
 
  Fig. 5. Events observed from the extended feature set of DynaLog 
 These results of table IV confirm observations made in 
previous work such as [17]-[21] about the limitations of 
dynamic analysis and illustrates the necessity to incorporate 
more realistic properties into emulator environments when 
attempting to detect malware. 
C. Results of malware and benign samples comparison 
In this section we present the results of comparing benign 
applications to malware applications using the DynaLog 
framework. In this experiment the available features from the 
feature sets: high level behaviour, granular events, API calls, 
were all enabled.  Table V shows the results obtained for 44 
features from DynaLog. 
Table V shows that 905 APKs in malware samples logged 
the ‘PHONE_STATE’ event. This was the feature most 
observed within the malware samples. ‘servicestart’ ranked 
second, and was called by 840 APKs. The collection of phone 
information in order to send to a remote server is a 
considerable concern, and malware often seeks to do so, as 
shown by ‘getDeviceId’, ‘getSubscriberId’, 
‘getSimSerialNumber’, NetworkOperator’, ‘Line1Number’, 
and ‘getSimOperator’. The results in Table V illustrates the 
capability of the features logged by DynaLog to characterize 
applications and potentially separate malicious applications 
from benign ones.  
 
 
TABLE IV.  SUBSET OF RESULTS FROM DROIDKUNGFU1 SAMPLES 
 
 
 
Properties 
Result before sandbox  
enhancement 
Result after sandbox  
enhancement 
getDeviceId 
(TelephonyManager) 
10 14 
getSubsriberId 
(TelephonyManager) 
3 9 
getSimSerialNumber 
(TelephonyManager) 
3 9 
getLine1Number 
(TelephonyManager) 
1 8 
Runtime.exec() 
 (Excuting process) 
1 10 
TABLE V.  COMPARISON RESULTS OF 970 BENIGN AND 970 
MALWARE SAMPLES  
Top Extracted Features Benign Malware 
% 
Benign 
% 
Malware 
1 PHONE_STATE 537 905 55.36 93.29 
2 servicestart 603 840 62.16 86.59 
3 PackageManager 441 601 45.46 61.95 
4 
intent.BOOT_COMPLE
TED 
150 534 15.46 55.05 
5 Process 287 480 29.58 49.48 
6 opennet 295 471 30.41 48.55 
7 checkPermission 169 456 17.42 47.01 
8 sendnet 250 421 25.77 43.40 
9 recvnet 244 418 25.15 43.09 
10 getInstance 279 417 28.76 42.98 
11 deviceId 229 367 23.60 37.83 
12 getMethod 256 358 26.39 36.90 
13 parse 190 316 19.58 32.57 
14 digest 221 288 22.78 29.69 
15 dataleaks 147 282 15.15 29.07 
16 getClass 120 226 12.37 23.29 
17 SubscriberId 40 225 4.123 23.19 
18 cryptousage 93 219 9.58 22.57 
19 SimSerialNumber 13 212 1.34 21.85 
20 lineNumber 33 190 3.40 19.58 
21 start 176 176 18.14 18.14 
22 NetworkOperator 44 171 4.53 17.62 
23 UMSDISCONNECTED 0 154 0 15.87 
24 ContentResolver 55 153 5.67 15.77 
25 connect 50 105 5.15 10.82 
26 getApplicationInfo 48 91 4.94 9.38 
27 SimOperator 26 85 2.68 8.76 
28 runtime.exec 40 70 4.12 7.21 
29 initCipher 67 70 6.90 7.21 
30 getInstance 57 70 5.87 7.21 
31 SMSRECEIVED 7 69 0.72 7.11 
32 SecretKey 46 64 4.74 6.59 
33 SimCountryIso 22 44 2.26 4.53 
34 
NEW_OUTGOING_C
ALL 
11 42 1.13 4.32 
35 
ACTION_POWER_CO
NNECTED 
0 35 0 3.60 
36 USER_PRESENT 22 31 2.26 3.195 
37 SIG_STR 0 24 0 2.47 
38 sendsms 0 18 0 1.85 
39 getLastKnownLocation 12 17 1.23 1.75 
40 openOrCreateDatabase 15 16 1.54 1.64 
41 PACKAGE_INSTALL 1 15 0.103 1.546 
42 
WAP_PUSH_RECEIV
ED 
3 7 0.309 0.721 
43 phonecalls 0 6 0 0.618 
44 SEND_MESSAGE 0 6 0 0.618 
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D. Limitations of the DynaLog framework 
DynaLog suffers from the same limitations that are well 
documented for dynamic analysis [17] [22] [23]. Hence we 
intend to continue to improve the framework to overcome these 
limitations. For apps that fail to log any output for dynamic 
analysis we may resort to static analysis based features in 
future. Presently, DynaLog does not log output from native 
code. Nevertheless, DynaLog incorporates API calls such as 
system.LoadLibrary that can indicate when calls are being 
made to native code libraries. DynaLog is designed to enable 
extension of features, as such system call related features could 
also be incorporated in future. 
IV. RELATED WORKS 
There are two fundamental practices in malware analysis: static 
analysis, which involves examining malware without running 
it; and dynamic analysis, which involves examining the 
malware whilst it runs. Several tools and frameworks have 
been proposed for detecting Android malware, and most of 
these can be categorized in this way. 
A. Android Static Analysis 
Several static analysis approaches and techniques have been 
proposed in the literature. Androguard [6] is a static analysis 
tool that can disassemble and decompile Android applications. 
ComDroid [9] is another static analysis tool for Android 
applications that detects vulnerabilities in communication. 
APKInspector [8] is a powerful GUI tool based on static 
analysis that can display a control-flow graph, application 
meta-data, Java source code, Dalvik bytecode, etc. Yerima et 
al. [24] presented an approach to detecting Android malware 
based on Bayesian classification models, using 58 features— 
including API calls, system commands, and intents—to 
classify Android applications as ‘malicious’ or ‘benign’. 
Further study was done on the framework by adding features 
driven from permissions in order to study the impact of 
Bayesian-based classification [25]. Yerima et al. [26] also 
proposed parallel classifiers for the features extracted from 
Android applications, and compared multiple parallel 
classification combinations in order to improve the detection 
rate. 
   Although static analysis frameworks provide valuable 
insight into Android application behaviour, there are several 
limitations to static analysis, including a vulnerability to 
sophisticated detection-avoidance techniques and update 
attacks. Some malware apply sophisticated techniques, such as 
obfuscation and polymorphic techniques that make it difficult 
to detect [27].  
B. Android Dynamic Analysis 
a) Machine-learning frameworks 
Shabtai et al. [11] provide a dynamic analysis framework 
called Andromaly, which applies several different machine-
learning algorithms to classify Android applications. However, 
they evaluated their techniques with four self-written malware 
applications, and it is unclear how they measured the detection 
performance.  
MADAM, a multi-level anomaly detector for Android 
malware [28], is similar to Andromaly. MADAM monitors 13 
features at the kernel level and the user level. A machine-
learning algorithm was used to classify the applications. 
However, they tested the framework on only 2 malware 
samples with 50 benign samples. Therefore, their results are 
limited to a small dataset. Crowdroid [29] is a machine-
learning framework based on a system called Strace. 
Crowdroid tests in the cloud, and in this way it differs from 
MADAM and Andromaly, both of which perform testing 
within the device. Furthermore, the evaluation was done using 
only two self-written malware samples.   
b) Open-source frameworks 
TaintDroid is a revised version of the Android OS (version 2.1) 
that was introduced by Enck et al. in October, 2010 [10]. This 
platform is able to monitor tainted data during runtime in order 
to identify private-information leaks. TaintDroid was 
implemented based on the Dalvik virtual machine. A number 
of studies [11], [30], [31], [32] have used TaintDroid for 
Android malware detection. The drawback to this platform is 
that it can only detect data leakage, whereas other malicious 
runtime behaviour can evade it, as demonstrated by Scrubdroid 
[33]. TaintDroid has been introduced into other dynamic 
analysis platforms, such as DroidBox and AppsPlayground 
[34], for data-leakage detection. 
Lantz developed DroidBox at the Google Summer of Code 
(GSoC) in 2011 [12]. The platform employs an integrated 
system, containing TaintDroid with a modification of 
Android’s core libraries. Moreover, DroidBox provides a 
visual illustration of the analysis results, and it installs 
automatically and runs as an Android Virtual Device (AVD). 
DroidBox is the first open-source dynamic analysis platform 
for Android. Therefore, it has been employed as a base system 
by various dynamic analysis platforms, such as Andrubis [16], 
Mobile-Sandbox [15], and SandDroid [14]. Furthermore, 
DroidBox only considers a limited set of behaviour, and it is 
restricted to one kernel version. DroidScope [13] is a wide-
ranging dynamic binary-control mechanism for Android based 
on virtual machine (VM) analysis. It was introduced in August, 
2012, as a modification of Dalvik’s ‘traces’, and it is attached 
to an emulator . 
c) Online services 
Google introduced Bouncer in February, 2012 [35]. Bouncer is 
a dynamic analysis platform that is used to scan submitted apps 
for potentially malicious behaviour. During Summercon in 
June, 2012, Oberheide and Miller presented their research 
regarding Bouncer [36]. They concluded that Bouncer could 
easily be evaded by malware applications.  
Andrubis is another dynamic analysis platform for Android 
applications, introduced in June, 2012, by the International 
Secure Systems Lab [16]. This framework was the first 
publicly online platform for dynamic analysis of Android 
applications. However, the code is not publicly available. 
Moreover, Andrubis cannot be used for large-scale analysis. 
Therefore, only a few applications can be uploaded at a time.  
CopperDroid was presented by Reina et al. in April, 2013 
[17]. The operating system for this platform is similar to that of 
DroidScope—i.e. both use VMI to track system call 
information regarding analysed applications. The application 
also allows its users to use an online portal to submit 
applications for analysis. Tracedroid is another free online 
analysis service that analyses applications using dynamic and 
static analysis [37].  
Like some of the existing dynamic analysis frameworks 
such as MobileSandbox, DynaLog uses the open source 
DroidBox as one of its building blocks. However, it introduces 
new granular features (i.e. events/actions).  DynaLog is also an 
extensible framework that enables automated mass dynamic 
analysis of Android applications. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we presented DynaLog a framework that enables 
automated mass dynamic analysis of applications in order to 
characterize them for analysis and potential detection of 
malicious behaviour.  DynaLog was built using existing open 
source tools and motivated by the need for an automated 
analysis platform since most existing frameworks are either 
closed source or allow only intermittent submissions of 
application online for analysis. DynaLog incorporates an 
emulator-based analysis sandbox based on DroidBox and 
implements an instrumentation module that allows API calls 
signatures to be embedded in applications so as to log various 
potentially malicious behaviour enabled through some API 
classes and methods.  We have performed several experiments 
to evaluate the framework and the results presented in this 
paper demonstrates its capabilities and effectiveness as a 
platform that can be used for mass detection of sophisticated 
Android malware. For future work we intend to develop and 
couple classification engines that can utilize the extensive 
features of DynaLog for accurate identification of malware 
samples. Furthermore, we intend to enhance the framework to 
improve its robustness against anti-analysis techniques 
employed by some malware whilst also incorporating new 
feature sets to improve the overall analysis and detection 
capabilities. 
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